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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 03973

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, US

SUBJECT: US/FRG PLANNING TALKS

REF: STATE 44373

1. AS REQUESTED PARA 11 OF REFTEL, EMBASSY COMMENTS FOLLOW ON ANTICIPATED GERMAN POSITIONS ON SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE PLANNING TALKS.

2. EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE

A. THE FRG CONTINUES TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE AND ATTENTION TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SCHMIDT'S PRAGMATIC APPROACH, AS OPPOSED TO WILLY BRANDT'S VERSION OF OSTPOLITIK; THE REALITIES OF A GERMAN ELECTION YEAR; AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE ARE ALL FACTORS WHICH INDICATE THAT PROGRESS WILL BE

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LIMITED OVER THE SHORT TERM. THE ACERBIC DEBATE OVER

THE FRG'S AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND WILL LIKELY SLOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRG'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE UNTIL AFTER THE FRG ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER. NEVERTHELESS, THE LONG TERM COMMITMENT OF THE FRG TO DETENTE -- WHICH SCHMIDT FORCIBLY RESTATED IN JANUARY -- WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A CERTAIN DEGREE OF DYNAMISM TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

B. THE SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

THE GERMAN SIDE WILL, IN THE FIRST PLACE, SEEK AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. IT WILL NOTE THE CONFIRMATION THAT BOTH BREZHNEV'S LEADERSHIP POSITION AND HIS POLICIES -- ESPECIALLY DETENTE -- RECEIVED. THE FRG BELIEVES THAT DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE USSR IS HAVING IN DEALING WITH THE WEST (IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE AND TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES) ARE LIKELY TO PROMPT THE USSR TO STRENGTHEN ITS INTERNAL REGIME AND ITS HOLD OVER EASTERN EUROPE.

C. SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY

THE GERMAN SIDE MAY RECALL THE EXTREME ANTI-DETENTE, ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC WHICH SCHMIDT WAS EXPOSED TO DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING LAST OCTOBER. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FRG BELIEVES THAT THE INITIAL STATEMENTS OF THE CHINESE ACTING PREMIER, HUA KUO-FENG, TO WESTERNERS SUCH AS CDU POLITICIANS MARX AND DREGGER INDICATE THAT ANTI-DETENTE AND ANTI-SOVIET THEMES REMAIN AN INTEGRAL PART OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. THE GERMAN SIDE IS EXPECTED TO POINT TO SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AS ONE FORCE DRIVING THE USSR TO ASSERT ITS IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AS WELL AS TO STRESS IDEOLOGICAL THEMES IN DEALING WITH THE WEST. GIVEN THE OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE OF FRG-USSR RELATIONS, THE FRG SHOULD NOT INDICATE ANY TENDENCY TO GET INTO A THREE-WAY RELATIONSHIP HERE.

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D. THE GERMAN SITUATION AND FRG POLICY IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT

WE WOULD EXPECT THE FRG REPS TO EXPRESS SOME SATISFACTION OVER THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE GDR. THE DECEMBER 1975 TRANSIT PACKAGE AND AGREEMENT ON THE AMOUNT OF LUMP SUM PAYMENTS UNDER THE TTA WERE CONCRETE STEPS FORWARD.

THE HEALTH AGREEMENT IS APPARENTLY WORKING WITHOUT HITCHES AND THE POSTAL AGREEMENT WAS INITIALED IN FEBRUARY AND WILL GO INTO EFFECT THIS SUMMER. THE GDR HAS SHOWN SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HAS TAKEN MODEST STEPS TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE, IF NOT TO CHANGE ITS POLICIES.

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THERE ARE SOME CLOUDS, HOWEVER, MOSTLY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN. THE GDR SO FAR REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH AN ALLIED ORDER REGARDING REICHSBAHN CONSTRUCTION WORK IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN UNDER THE DECEMBER GDR/FRG TRANSIT PACKAGE. CONTINUED FAILURE TO COMPLY COULD AT THE EXTREME JEOPARDIZE THE ENTIRE PACKAGE. THE GDR IS ALSO BEING DIFFICULT OVER THE SPANDAU CANAL LOCKS

AGREEMENT AND OVER NEGOTIATIONS TO OPEN THE TELTOW CANAL. FRG-GDR TALKS ON A CULTURAL AGREEMENT HAVE GOTTEN NOWHERE, AND MAY BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLICATED IF BONN DECIDES TO ESTABLISH A GERMAN CULTURAL FOUNDATION IN BERLIN. THERE IS ALSO THE ELBE RIVER PROBLEM, BUT IT APPEARS THAT ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON MARKING THE BOUNDARY IS AS MUCH DUE TO INTERNAL FRG POLITICS AS TO GDR OBDURACY.

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THE GDR CONTINUES TO STRESS "ABGRENZUNG" BUT INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS -- GIVEN THE OVERALL CIRCUMSTANCES -- ARE PERHAPS BETTER THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED.

BERLIN CONTINUES TO BE A SENSITIVE SPOT FOR THE FRG, AND IN THIS ELECTION YEAR WILL BE EVEN MORE SO. THE FRG REPS CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH THE QA HAS BROUGHT ABOUT IN THE PRACTICAL SITUATION, BUT ALSO TO POINT OUT THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT GDR AND SOVIET AIMS RE BERLIN HAVE NOT CHANGED. THE FRG REPS CAN BE EXPECTED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIED ROLE AS OPPOSED TO WHAT BONN CAN ACHIEVE. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE FRG HAS PRODUCED A STUDY WHICH PREDICTS A LARGE DECLINE IN THE POPULATION OF THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN BY THE 1980'S AND THE FRG REPS MAY FOCUS SOME ATTENTION ON HOW PUBLIC CONFIDENCE CAN BE MAINTAINED DURING A PERIOD OF DECLINING POPULATION AND CHANGED POSITION OF THE CITY FROM THAT OF FOCAL POINT OF EAST-WEST TENSION.

E. BALANCE SHEET AND PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE

IN EUROPE THE FRG BELIEVES THAT ANY BALANCE SHEET ON DETENTE REFLECTS FAVORABLY THE BENEFIT TO THE WEST THIS POLICY HAS PRODUCED. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WILL POINT TO THE NET BENEFIT OF THE FRG'S TREATIES WITH MOSCOW AND WARSAW, THE QA, CSCE, AND POTENTIALLY MBFR.

THE FRG BELIEVES THAT PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III OF CSCE AND THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE PUT THE USSR ON THE DEFENSIVE. IT FURTHER BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WILL BE TO ADOPT OFFENSIVE MEANS IN DEALING WITH THE WEST: REJECTION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF BASKET III, REVIVAL OF ANTI-WEST PROPAGANDA, ASSERTION OF IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AND AN ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE.

THESE FACTORS, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT THIS IS AN
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ELECTION YEAR IN BOTH THE US AND THE FRG, WILL PLACE
PARAMETERS ON WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
IN THE SHORT TERM.

THE FRG RECEIVES MBFR AS THE LOGICAL CONTINUATION OF
DETENTE IN EUROPE. IT BELIEVES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS
PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE LESSENING OF MILITARY
TENSIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

THE GERMANS HAVE A REAL INTEREST IN THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BECOME CONCERNED IF THE
TALKS THREATENED TO BREAK UP. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE
GERMANS ARE IN NO RUSH FOR A NEGOTIATING SUCCESS IN
THIS NATIONAL ELECTION YEAR. RATHER, THEY CONSIDER THAT
SUCCESS IN THE TALKS IS LIKELY TO COME IN THE LONG
RATHER THAN THE SHORT TERM, AND THEY ARE WILLING TO BE
PATIENT. WHILE PAST EAST-WEST NEGOTIATING SUCCESSES DO
NOT NECESSARILY GUARANTEE A FAVORABLE OUTCOME IN MBFR,
THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT A GENUINE EFFORT SHOULD BE
MADE, TAKING APPROPRIATE CARE TO PROTECT WESTERN SECURITY
INTERESTS SINCE MBFR, UNLIKE CSCE, COULD LEAD
TO CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES WITH POTENTIALLY
ADVERSE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FRG.

WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE FRG WILL GET OUT IN FRONT
OF THE ALLIANCE ON MBFR MATTERS. A CAREFUL VETTING OF

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PROPOSED ALLIANCE POSITIONS RATHER THAN INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO MBFR WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO BE
THE GERMAN GAME PLAN.

F. GLOBALLY

THE FRG WILL RALLY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S ASSERTION THAT
WE SHOULD "SEEK TO RELAX TENSIONS SO THAT WE CAN
CONTINUE A POLICY OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH." THE
GERMAN SIDE WILL EXPRESS CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANGOLA AND THE REST OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. IT IS
EXPECTED ALSO TO STATE THE SALT REMAINS THE CENTERPIECE
OF GLOBAL DETENTE.

WHILE THE FRG IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MBFR, THE CURRENT
FEELING IN BONN IS THAT SALT IS MUCH THE MORE
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IMPORTANT TO THE SUPERPOWERS AND MUST BE CONCLUDED
SUCCESSFULLY BEFORE REAL PROGRESS CAN BE EXPECTED IN
MBFR. WHILE APPRECIATIVE OF U.S. EFFORTS TO CONSULT
WITH THE NATO ALLIES ON SALT MATTERS, THE GERMANS ARE
BY THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE
MERELY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS PERMITTED SELECTIVE GLIMPSES
OF WHAT IS GOING ON. THIS POSITION LEADS NATURALLY TO
A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WARINESS THAT EUROPEAN, I.E.,
FRG, INTERESTS MAY BE SACRIFICED ON THE ALTAR OF
SUPERPOWER EXPEDIENCY. U.S. CONSULTATIONS HAVE DONE
MUCH TO ALLAY SUCH SUSPICIONS, BUT THEY CAN NEVER BE
PUT TO REST COMPLETELY. NEVERTHELESS, THE GERMANS
CONTINUE TO PERCEIVE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AS THE

FOUNDATION OF GLOBAL DETENTE AND WILL BE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. EFFORTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT.

3. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

A. COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE

THE FRG IS EXPECTED TO POINT TO SOUTHERN FLANK PROBLEMS AS THE MAJOR ISSUE FACING NATO. IT WILL URGE RESUMPTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS, AND WILL PLEAD INABILITY TO SUBSTITUTE COMPLETELY FOR THE INTERRUPTED U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO TURKEY.

THE FRG WILL VOICE CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY. THE GERMAN SIDE WILL REAFFIRM THE FRG'S OBJECTION TO SOCIALIST ASSOCIATION WITH COMMUNIST PARTIES. THE FRG WILL ASSERT ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH SPANISH INTEGRATION INTO DEMOCRATIC WESTERN EUROPE AS FAST AS THE OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE EC PERMIT.

B. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

THE FRG WILL RESTATE ITS COMMITMENT TO UNIFICATION, OR AT LEAST INTEGRATION. IT WILL EXPRESS, HOWEVER, ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AS THE "PAYMASTER OF EUROPE." IT WILL COMPLAIN ABOUT THE COST OF EC

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POLICIES, "INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACY," AND LACK OF COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF OTHER EC MEMBERS TO INTEGRATION.

WHILE VOICING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE IMPETUS TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION UNDERLYING THE TINDEMANNS REPORT, THE FRG WILL EXPRESS ITS RESERVATIONS ON SOME SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS, INCLUDING TWO-TIERED MEMBERSHIP AND THE NAMING OF A EUROPEAN HEAD OF GOVERNMENT AS INTER-LOCUTOR WITH U.S. THE FRG, NEVERTHELESS, REGARDS THE REPORT AS A USEFUL OUTLINE OF A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO UNIFICATION, WHICH PLACES GREATER STRESS ON POLITICAL ACTIONS. FRG ADVOCATES PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, WHERE LITTLE HAS BEEN DONE, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM TOWARD UNIFICATION, ESPECIALLY SINCE SUCH MOMENTUM HAS BEEN LACKING OF LATE ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT. THE FRG LOOKS INCREASINGLY TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE PRACTICAL, HARD-HEADED, AND MEANINGFUL LEADERSHIP TO THE EC.

C. STATE OF US/EUROPEAN RELATIONS NATO, EC, MTN

FRG WILL CITE THE NEED FOR CONSTANT EFFORT TO IMPROVE US/EUROPEAN RELATIONS, GIVEN THEIR CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. IT MAY STATE THAT THE U.S. AND EUROPE MET A CHALLENGE IN THE YEAR OF EUROPE WHEN RELATIONS WERE TESTED AND THEN EXPRESS ITS CONVICTION THAT RELATIONS ARE NOW ON

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FIRM BASIS. THE U.S. AND EUROPE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO RESTORE SOUND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AVOIDING A RESURGENCE OF INFLATION.

THE GERMAN SIDE WILL POINT TO THE NEED FOR CONTINUED U.S. LEADERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE. NO OTHER INSTITUTION,

INCLUDING THE EC, CAN SERVE AS A SUBSTITUTE IN THE SECURITY FIELD.

D. MTN

THE FRG MAY POINT OUT THAT IT IS ONE OF THE STRONGEST PROONENTS OF THE GOAL OF MAKING SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE MTN TOWARD A MORE LIBERAL TRADING SYSTEM. THE FRG FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT SUCH PROGRESS WILL

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NOT ONLY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ITS HIGHLY COMPETITIVE MANUFACTURING SECTOR BUT WILL ALSO PROVE TO THE THIRD WORLD THAT MORE CAN BE GAINED FROM A LIBERAL THAN FROM A DIRIGIST WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER. IT MAY WARN THAT PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MTN, AND INDICATE ITS CONCERN THAT THE U.S. IS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO COMBAT THESE PRESSURES. THE PLANNING STAFF HAS SAID IT HAS LITTLE ECONOMIC CAPABILITY AND WILL LOOK TO THE U.S. TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS SUBJECT.

4. NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS

A. PROSPECT FOR CIEC AND UNCTAD IV, ROLE OF OECD, AND OPTIMAL DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG THESE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

A. THE GERMAN SIDE WILL MOST LIKELY STRESS THAT IT PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON AVOIDING A RUPTURE OF THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE TAKING PLACE IN CIEC AND OTHER FORA. THE FRG IS LIKELY TO POINT OUT THAT IT IS MORE VULNERABLE THAN THE U.S. TO THIRD WORLD ACTIONS DUE TO HEAVY RELIANCE OF FRG ECONOMY ON FOREIGN SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS, AND THAT EXTERNAL TRANSACTIONS IN TOTO FORM MUCH LARGER SHARE OF GERMAN GNP THAN IS CASE FOR FOR THE U.S. THE FRG WILL STATE ITS GOAL OF USING THE DIALOGUE TO CONVINCE THE THIRD WORLD THAT IT WILL BENEFIT MORE FROM A LIBERAL WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM CONDUCIVE TO GROWING OUTPUT AND DEMAND IN BOTH DEVELOPING AND INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES THAN FROM A SYSTEM CONCENTRATING FROM THE START ON A TRANSFER OF RESOURCES AND DECISION-MAKING TO HAVE-NOTS.

THE FRG WILL INDICATE THAT IT IS NOT SANGUINE CONCERNING THE UPCOMING DEBATE AT UNCTAD IV. IT IS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT LDC DEMANDS RELATED TO EITHER OF THE TWO MAJOR ITEMS ON THE AGENDA: COMMODITY AGREEMENTS AND DEBT. IT THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT WORK

PROGRAMS IN THE CIEC COMMISSIONS MUST BE CAREFULLY
ORCHESTRATED TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE
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INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES ARE FORCED TO TABLE THEIR PROPOSALS PRIOR TO UNCTAD MEETING. IN THE FRG VIEW, WE HAVE A MUCH BETTER CHANCE OF ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME FROM UNCTAD IV IF DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO LDC TRADE AND DEBT PROBLEMS CAN FIRST TAKE PLACE THERE. THE FRG MAY POINT OUT DIFFERENCES WITHIN EC ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS PROBLEM, BUT IT WOULD ALSO INDICATE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE. THE FRG IS LIKELY TO ADHERE TO THE EC LINE OF DOWNPLAYING THE ROLE OF THE OECD AS FORUM FOR COORDINATING EC TACTICS IN CIEC. THE OECD IS, HOWEVER, A VALUED FORUM FOR ASSESSING OVERALL TRENDS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS WELL AS EXCHANGING VIEWS ON BASIC OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE.

B. FRG FOREIGN POLICY OUTSIDE EUROPE

FRG WILL SAY LITTLE OTHER THAN POINTING TO THE FRG MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE. FRG MAY OUTLINE THE INITIATIVES IT HAS TAKEN BILATERALLY, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH VISITS OF HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS TO AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA TO IMPORVE RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT MAY EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE LARGER AND MORE MODERATE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD.

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C. MIDDLE EAST

FRG WILL VOICE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT OF ISRAELI/ARAB CONFLICT. IT WILL WELCOME U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION, POINT TO ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES THROUGH THE EC MEDITERRANEAN POLICY, THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE, AND ON A BILATERAL BASIS, AND WILL CLAIM ITS EFFORTS COMPLEMENT OURS.

D. EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE FRG IS EXPECTED TO BRIEF US ON ITS ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM, ITS CONTINUED EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN ITS PRESENCE IN SEA, AND TO ITS CONFIDENTIAL

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ESPOUSAL OF EC-ASEAN CONTACTS.

THE FRG MAY DISCUSS THE LACK OF RESULTS OF GROMYKO'S JANUARY VISIT TO TOKYO AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN WILL SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH CHINA INCLUDING AN ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE.

E. CONNECTION BETWEEN NORTH/SOUTH AND EAST/WEST PROBLEMS

FRG DOES NOT EXPECT THIS DISCUSSION TO BE EXTENSIVE. IT MAY NOTE THE EFFECT PROBLEMS SUCH AS ANGOLA CAN HAVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS. ON THIS ISSUE THE FRG HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION, BOTH WITHIN

THE EC AND WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES. GENSCHER HAS SPOKEN OUT PUBLICLY IN OUR SUPPORT.

THE FRG MAY ALSO POSE THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD IN THE DIALOGUE. IN THIS CONNECTION IT MAY NOTE SOME POSITIVE FACTORS, SUCH AS COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WHEAT AND TIN AGREEMENTS. IT MAY ALSO RAISE THE PROBLEM PRESENTED TO THE WEST BY EGYPT, WHICH HAS HEAVY DEBT PAYMENTS TO MAKE TO THE USSR AT THE SAME TIME IT IS SEEKING AID FROM THE WEST.

THE PROBLEM OF CUBA'S AFRICAN INTERVENTION MAY ALSO BE DISCUSSED.

5. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT U.S. SIDE SEEK TO REASSURE THE FRG THAT U.S. PLANNING IS BASED ON CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR NATO. AT THE SAME TIME WE WELCOME EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BECAUSE A UNITED EUROPE IS A STRONG AND FREE EUROPE. EUROPE MUST RECOGNIZE ITS FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND HOLD IN CHECK THOSE ISSUES ON WHICH WE COMPETE. THE U.S. WILL MAKE THE SAME EFFORT.

6. THE U.S. WILL ALSO MAINTAIN CLOSE COLLABORATION AND A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS ALLIES IN BOTH MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS (MBFR) AND IN OUR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR (SALT). WE REALIZE THAT WE CONFIDENTIAL

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MUST DEAL FROM A UNITED AND STRONG POSITION WHEN WE NEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST.

7. OUR TRADITIONAL CLOSE COLLABORATION EXTENDS TO THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE, WHERE WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO MEET THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE THIRD WORLD.

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